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3 The process of devolution 
in the UK 
Simona Scarparo 
Introduction 
In the UK, the process of devolution has a long history. It goes back to 1886, 
when the Liberal leader William Gladstone proposed the Home Rule for 
Ireland. Devolution challenges the culture of the unitary nature of the British 
State and the supremacy of Parliament, as power is handed over from central 
government to national parliaments and assemblies: 'Devolution may be 
defined as consisting of three elements: the transfer to a subordinate elected 
body, on a geographical basis, of functions at present exercised by ministers 
and Parliament' (Bogdanor, 2001: 2). 
Northern Ireland experienced devolution (Home Rule) in 1921 which 
lasted until 1972, when it was prorogued and later abolished by the British 
Government. Scottish historical national identity had been acknowledged 
since the voluntary union of the crowns in 1603. Scotland had separate local 
government and education systems, an established Church, local press and its 
own banknotes. The Scottish Office and the Scottish Secretary were instituted 
in 1885, dealing with matters related to health, police and judicial affairs, 
prisons and regional development (O'Neill, 2000). 1 Unlike Scotland, Wales 
was not granted any special legislation or any administrative status. However, 
the diversity of Welsh culture was acknowledged in the demand for official 
recognition of Welsh as an indigenous language. 
In the late 1960s, Scottish and Welsh nationalist movements expressed a 
growing concern over the need to obtain recognition of distinctive identities 
and the opportunity to be in charge of their economic interests (Jones, 200 I: 
269), even though Welsh nationalism was more concerned with 'the defence 
and preservation of a cultural way of life than with political independence' 
(Bogdanor, 2001: 7). In 1968 a Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Kilbran-
don was set up in order to analyse 'the functions of the central legislature and 
government in relation to the several countries, nations and regions of the 
United Kingdom' (Bogdanor, 200 I: 270). The report of the Commission, 
issued in 1973, was regarded as a signal event (O'Neill, 2000: 72) as it pro-
posed qualified devolved governments for Scotland and Wales through 
elected assemblies. 
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However, the subsequent devolution bill issued in 1979 (Scotland and Wales 
Bill) devised an asymmetric devolution, as it proposed greater home rule for 
Scotland than for Wales. Both countries were supposed to elect assemblies by 
a 'first past the post' system, but Westminster retained the power to legislate 
on any devolved matter. Scotland had some legislative competence and execu-
tive discretion over devolved Scottish Office functions, i.e. local government, 
social policy and infrastructural matters. Wales, instead, was granted a local 
government-style committee. Neither of the two assemblies had fiscal com-
petence. The arrangements set up in the Scotland and Wales Bill aimed 
predominantly at conciliating Scottish and Welsh public opinion (Mitchell, 
2002: 246). The referendum held in Scotland and Wales in 1979 showed that 
there was insufficient support for devolution. In Scotland a narrow majority, 
but not enough to beat the weighted majority required by Parliament, was in 
favour of devolution. In Wales, a strong majority voted against devolution. 
Several reasons for explaining the outcome of the 1979 referendum were 
identified. A key factor was the division within the Labour party, as many 
Labour politicians considered the problem of reconciling equality of social 
rights with the mechanisms of devolution. Other Labour party members were 
not happy about challenging the unity of the state (Mitchell, 2002: 246). 
During the 1980s, under the Conservative government, the emphasis was 
laid on the strength of a unitary government and the importance of parlia-
mentary sovereignty, dismissing the potential importance of a diversity of 
institutions: 'Sub-national identity was discounted as misplaced sentimental-
ity, an obsolescent provincialism, and devolution was staunchly resisted as 
another tier added to already overblown bureaucracy' (O'Neill, 2000: 73). 
During the 1980s and 1990s the level of conviction and the extent of support 
towards constitutional change grew significantly. In Scotland, the Labour 
party had strengthened its support for devolution, proposing a Scottish 
Parliament elected through some form of proportional representation, with a 
wider remit than the one proposed in the 1970s. The Campaign for a Scottish 
Assembly set up a cross party committee, representing a coalition of interests 
from different groups of civil society (local authorities, churches, trade unions, 
academia, environmentalists and the business community), which issued a 
'Claim of Right for Scotland' demanding a parliament with full powers 
(Mitchell, 2002: 248~249). In Wales, the debate on devolution was conducted 
in a similar way to Scotland, but it moved with a different pace and with a 
subtly different spirit. The arguments in favour of devolution did not attract 
the same support as in Scotland, as there was more ambivalence about political 
identity (O'Neill, 2000: 76). 
The differences between the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish support 
towards devolution are also shown by the results of the referendums held in 
1997 and 1998 as shown in Table 3 .1. 
Scotland and Northern Ireland manifested a stronger support towards 
devolution than Wales, with a much higher percentage turn out in Northern 
Ireland. 
20 Simona Scarparo 
Table 3.1 Devolution referendums 
Pro devolution 
Pro tax-raising power 
Turn out 
Referendum date 
Northern Ireland 
71.1% 
81.1% 
1998 
Source: Data compiled from Bogdanor, 2001. 
Scotland Wales 
74.3% 50.3% 
63.5% 
60.4% 59% 
1997 1997 
In the following sections the development of the devolution process in Scot-
land, Northern Ireland and Wales, and its characteristics will be analysed. 
Devolution in Northern Ireland 
The Home Rule experience 
Between 1921 and 1972 Northern Ireland experienced a form of devolution, 
as the six counties of Ulster which remained within the UK had Home Rule. 
This form of devolution, however, cannot be compared easily with the current 
form for two main reasons. First, the establishment of a separate parliament 
was a measure taken by the British government in order to try to solve the 
Irish problem. Thus, the devolved parliament was not created for answering 
claims and needs of separation from the union. On the contrary, it was 
accepted, after a long and controversial process, as a measure to prevent the 
absorption of Northern Ireland into the Irish Free State. Second, the conflict 
between the Protestant unionist community, which aimed to maintain con-
nections with the UK, and the Catholic nationalist community, which instead 
favoured a union with the rest of Ireland, played a major role in shaping the 
process towards devolution and its characteristics (Bogdanor, 2001: 55-56). 
Because of the pressures created by the above-mentioned conflict, there was 
a strong determination to make devolution work. In addition, the Unionist 
party had a permanent majority in the Belfast parliament, therefore the work 
of the devolved government was not threatened by a strong opposition 
(Bogdanor, 2001: 69). 
The Northern Ireland Parliament in Belfast was set up in a way that repli-
cated Westminster. It was conferred a general grant of legislative power, 
which was subjected to specific limitations, on matters like relations with 
foreign countries, defence and external trade, where responsibility was retained 
by Westminster. In terms of fiscal matters, the legislation envisaged that the 
two parts of Ireland could be self-sufficient fiscal units. It was believed that 
Northern Ireland could have been provided with her own revenue, which 
would be used to finance services. However, the percentage of transferred 
taxation was very small (less than 20 per cent of total taxation), and related 
only to minor taxes. Given this, Northern Ireland had to rely heavily on 
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reserved taxation in order to provide services with an equivalent level of 
quality to the rest of the UK. 
By the end of the 1970s its financial allocation was determined according 
to needs and not revenue, thus the financial arrangements changed form 
being revenue-based to being expenditure-based. In this situation, the budget 
for Northern Ireland was effectively determined by Westminster and needed 
its approval, after being negotiated between the Northern Ireland Ministry of 
Finance and the Treasury. This meant that there was a tight control on the 
allocation of resources. Their use was subject to severe scrutiny in order to 
ensure that 'it was not being used by Northern Ireland to secure for herself a 
higher level of service than that to which she was entitled' (Bogdanor, 2001: 
86). Thus, financial accountability was held towards the Treasury in London 
and not towards Northern Ireland citizens. The budget was decided behind 
closed doors without any involvement of members of the Belfast parliament. 
In this way Northern Ireland did not have any financial autonomy, as the 
taxing power and spending power were divided, the first resided in London 
and the latter in Belfast, with an additional negative effect of weakening the 
correlation between expenditure and revenue. 
The Home Rule system was brought to an end in 1972 because British MPs 
and ministers did not consider Stormont able to deal with the outbreak and 
intensification of violence from 1968 onwards. Thus, from 1972 until 1999 
Northern Ireland was largely under British direct rule, which was supposed to 
be a temporary solution. As a matter of fact, under this arrangement it was 
felt that there was not enough attention to policies related to Northern Ireland, 
with a lack of accountability of the parties involved. 
The Belfast Agreement 
A significant deficiency of the direct rule resided in the fact that political 
parties had 'all the advantages of political activity with none of the disadvan-
tages of responsibility' (Bogdan or, 2001: 99). The establishment of direct rule 
was meant to be a short-term measure by the British government. Devolution 
should have followed shortly. However, despite several attempts to introduce 
it, between 1972 and 1997,2 in the form of an independent assembly, and with 
the formation of a power-sharing executive, it was not until 1994 that signifi-
cant measures towards devolution were to be taken. 
When the IRA announced a cease-fire in August 1994, Sinn Fein was able 
to participate in the political debate. Multi-party talks started in 1996 
between the elected representatives of the political parties culminating in the 
signing of the Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement in 1998. This Agreement 
was approved by a referendum, held in May 1998, with a turnout of 81.1 per 
cent, of which 71.1 per cent voted in favour of devolution, and 28.9 per cent 
voted against. The Agreement proposed the election of 108 members to the 
Assembly by a single transferable vote for a fixed-term period of four years. 
The Assembly was devolved powers in the following areas: 
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• finance 
• personnel 
• agriculture 
• education 
• health 
• social services 
• economic development 
• environment . 
Among the devolved areas there is no provision for tax-raising power, as 
opposed to the Scottish Parliament. The most important characteristic of 
devolution as designed by the Agreement is the concept of power-sharing. 3 
This principle, recognised as an institutional novelty of the Agreement 
(O'Leary, 2002: 284), shapes the way in which the Executive is formed, and 
determines the voting procedures for taking 'key decisions'. The Executive is 
led by a dyarchy: the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister are elected 
jointly by the Assembly through a specific form of cross-community support 
(Bogdanor, 2001: 106): a 'parallel consent procedure' (O'Leary, 2002: 284). 
This means that there has to be the support of a majority of parties, a 
majority of the designated unionists and of the designated nationalists voting 
(Bogdanor, 2001: 106). 
In this way, each community (unionists and nationalists) would have the 
ability to nominate a candidate for one of these positions that was acceptable 
to the other community. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister 
hold office together, thus the resignation of one of the two implies the loss of 
the office for the other. In addition, they are semi-presidential figures because 
the Assembly cannot remove them. Both hold the same functions - symbolic 
and external representation - and have identical powers, leading and organis-
ing the activity of the 'Executive Committee' of ministers (O'Leary, 2002: 
285). The advantage of this system resides in the incentives provided to each 
party in claiming their right to ministries. The dyarchy was designed for 
linking the representatives of the two communities together in order to obtain 
a consensus that would push towards an overall common policy, despite the 
absence of a pre-negotiated government programme. The disadvantage is due 
to the fact that the dyarchy necessitates the collaboration and cooperation of 
the First and the Deputy First Ministers and also of their respective majorities 
in order to function properly. This cooperation has proved to be very difficult 
to achieve and maintain (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001: 268). According to 
O'Leary (2002: 286) two reasons have made the dual premiership an unstable 
device: a) the unreliability of the Unionist community in favour of the 
devolution process; b) the efficacy of the resignation weapon available to the 
First and the Deputy First Ministers. 
The First and the Deputy First Ministers do not nominate the members of 
the 'Executive Committee'. These members are selected by party leaders 
in accordance with the number of seats that each party has acquired in 
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proportion to their strength in the Assembly. This mechanism was devised 
in order to ensure that any party has the opportunity of being part of the 
government. As a consequence, the executive is formed by a voluntary 
coalition, as parties can decide not to take part in it (O'Leary, 2002: 286). 
Another important characteristic of the Northern Ireland Assembly, related 
to the principle of power sharing, is the existence of two forms of qualified 
majority voting applied when voting for 'key decisions': the choice of the 
First and Deputy First Ministers, dismissal from office, budgetary procedure, 
standing orders, election of the Assembly's Presiding Officer (Speaker), the 
programme for government, and policy issues defined as 'key' (Meehan, 1999: 
20; Wilford, 2000: 580). Each member of the Legislative Assembly has to 
identify him/herself either as a 'Unionist', a 'Nationalist', or 'Other'. This 
process of self-labelling is necessary for the application of the test of cross-
community support when voting for the 'key decisions' mentioned above, 
which have to be designated in advance. The cross-community support is 
obtained by what is called parallel consent - a majority of those members 
present and voting, including a majority of the unionists and nationalists 
present and voting.4 Those who designated themselves as 'Other' do not 
count. This mechanism of cross-community support has been considered 
controversial, because it protects the interests of the nationalists and the 
unionists, disregarding completely those members qualified as 'Others' 
(Meehan, 1999: 20). However, it has been designed in order to guarantee 
ministerial autonomy, avoiding the situation of transforming departments 
into 'party fiefdoms' (Wilford, 2000: 581 ), and to strengthen the model of 
partnership. 
Within the Assembly, 'Statutory Committees' are created in order to provide 
a stronger and more focused power to the Assembly members in exercising 
the policy advice roles and their scrutiny powers over the work of the execu-
tive. These committees have the primary function of advising and assisting 
in the policy formulation of each of the departments with which they are 
associated. They also have the power to initiate primary legislation, thus 
sharing this power with the Executive Committee. Each of these Statutory 
Committees has eleven members. The Business Committee formally desig-
nates these members, although in reality the party whips allocate them 
according to a proportional principle. 
Devolution in Scotland 
The pte-devolution arrangements 
Despite the fact that the Act of Union promulgated in 1707 abolished the 
separate parliaments for Scotland and England, Scotland retained many 
distinctive features, specifically a separate legal and administrative system, 
which reinforced the need for the Westminster Parliament to consider 
Scotland's specific needs. In addition, the assimilation of Scotland within the 
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UK was made more difficult by the influence of the Home Rule settlement in 
Northern Ireland, which kept Scottish nationalist feeling alive. 
In 1885 the Scottish Office was established and this can be considered an 
initial form of devolution. The Office, held by the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, begun with hardly any functions and it was a department of the 
UK government. However, over time it acquired an increasing number of 
responsibilities for issues such as health, justice, education, agriculture, fisher-
ies and farming, which in England and Wales were handled by nine or ten 
Whitehall departments. Until 1999 the statutory functions of the Scottish 
Office were administered by five main departments. The role of the Secretary 
of State for Scotland fulfilled two criteria: 1) it was recognised as a govern-
mental device that ensured the handling of Scottish affairs in Scotland; 2) it 
guaranteed that the specific needs of Scotland were taken into consideration 
in policy making and legislation. However, any attempt to introduce or initi-
ate policies that might have serious implications for the 'English' departments 
would be overruled by the UK government, thus setting the boundaries of 
the autonomy enjoyed by the Secretary of State for Scotland. According to 
Bogdanor (2001: 114) the role of the Scottish Office in the most recent years, 
before devolution, became less the one of a proponent of separate Scottish 
initiatives determined by different needs, and more one of an advocate for 
drawing increasing financial resources. 
With the introduction of the population-based Barnett formula, 5 which 
regulates the provision of financial resources from the Treasury towards 
Scotland, there has been less scope for the Secretary of State to do this. This 
has somehow undermined the position of the Secretary of State. In addition, 
there have been claims that the Scottish Office was held less accountable than 
the other English governmental departments. These claims were based on a 
number of points. First of all the Secretary of State had to divide his time 
between Westminster and Scottish Office duties, leaving very little time for 
exercising control over the implementation of decisions. Second, there was a 
problem of the overloading of the Scottish Executive as a result of the wide 
range of responsibilities attributed to the Scottish Office. More and more 
decisions were actually taken by civil servants rather than by the ministers. 
And finally, there was very little scrutiny of the activity of the Scottish Office 
in Westminster, as the time dedicated to enquiring over the Scottish Office's 
functions was set at once a month. 
The pre-devolution special arrangements for the conduct of the Scottish 
business in the House of Commons did reinforce the idea of a Scottish polit-
ical distinctiveness. The political arrangement for the Scottish affairs in 
Westminster reflected an anomalous situation. In fact there was a separate 
legal system and separate arrangements for governmental matters, but there 
was not a separate legislature and therefore not a separate electorate to which 
the Scottish executive was to be held accountable (Bogdanor, 2001: 117). 
During the 1970s, the dissatisfaction with the arrangements for dealing with 
Scottish affairs needed a different solution and devolution was advocated as 
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a democratic solution, which would have provided adequate institutions for 
preserving and representing Scottish interest and needs. 
Similarly to what was happening in Northern Ireland, at the end of the 
nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century, there was a claim 
by nationalistic movements for a Scottish home rule. The propositions for 
Scottish home rule were presented to the House of Commons on several 
occasions but they were never successfully approved. 6 During the second half 
of the twentieth century, the Scottish Nationalist Party grew in strength and 
support, mostly as a party that could give voice to the Scottish identity. 
During the 1970s the argument towards the recognition of Scottish indepen-
dence was fostered by the discovery of oil in the North Sea and by the UK 
joining the European Community. The discovery of oil brought about the 
argument that Scotland should have been in charge of the decisions on how 
to use and exploit this natural resource. The entrance of the UK in the 
European Community raised the preoccupation of the distance between 
Scotland and the European centre of decision making (Brussels) with the 
view expressed that Scottish issues would become even more peripheral than 
in Westminster. 
In 1979 a referendum was held on proposals by the government for estab-
lishing a Scottish Assembly, but these proposals did not obtain sufficient 
electoral support. However, the pressure for constitutional change increased 
during the 1980s and 1990s pushed by a growing sense of Scottish identity, 
and feelings of difference (Brown, 2000: 543). The political system was 
considered inadequate in representing Scottish needs in Whitehall. In the 
meantime, all over Europe there was a growing debate on the principle of 
'subsidiarity' and the need to bring political decision-makers closer to their 
community (Brown, 2000: 543). Thus, in 1989 the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention was established in order to frame a detailed plan for devolution. 
This plan included proposals for a Scottish Parliament directly elected by the 
Scottish electorate, holding wide legislative powers. Representatives of the 
Scottish civic society, including some of the political parties, formed this 
convention. The Scottish Constitutional Convention's Report, issued in 
1995, was used as a model and starting point for further proposals on devolu-
tion, which were presented to the UK government in 1997. As already high-
lighted, these proposals were tested in the referendum held in September 
1997, where the electorate showed a strong support in favour of devolution. 
The proposals for devolution were formalised in the Scotland Act 1998, 
following which the Scottish Parliament officially started in July 1999. 
The shape of the 'new parliament' 
The Scottish Parliament represents the principal institution (Mitchell, 2000: 
606). The two distinctive features of the Scottish Parliament are the electoral 
system and its internal working. Regarding the first point, the electoral sys-
tem proposed by the Convention was considered a model for representing a 
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significant change in the political culture. The electoral system had to represent 
the consensual nature, which was considered a fundamental model for the 
parliament itself, and had to provide a greater proportionality with the fol-
lowing benefits (Mitchell, 2000: 607): 
• it would relate the number of seats for the different parties to the number 
of votes expressed for them; 
• it ensures an equal representation of men and women, encouraging fair 
representation of minorities; 
• it guarantees adequate representation of less populated areas; 
• it maintains a link between members and their constituency; 
• it is simple to understand; 
• it would guarantee the electorate a significant power. 
The outcome of the elections held in May 1999 was a parliament consisting 
of 129 seats to which members were elected combining the traditional 'first 
past the post' system with a form of proportional representation. Seventy-
three members were elected in single-member constituencies, which were 
based on the pre-existing Westminster boundaries. Fifty-six members were 
elected in accordance with the proportional representation system called the 
Additional Member System, seven for each of the eight regions used in the 
European parliamentary elections (O'Neill, 2000: 80). 
The Scotland Act designed a Scottish Parliament with considerable author-
ity. Matters that are devolved include: 
• health and social work 
• education and training 
• local government and housing 
• justice and police 
• agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
• the environment 
• tourism, sport and heritage 
• economic development and internal transport. 
The Scottish Parliament has full legislative competence. This comprises 
primary legislative power across a wide range of domestic policy areas and 
potentially the power to legislate in any non-reserved area of policy, and 
secondary legislation. It maintains the Scottish Office's responsibility for 
funding a wide range of services in Scotland and for overseeing other public 
bodies, including local governments and quangos (Bradbury and Mitchell, 
2001: 268). In order to exercise this power the Scottish Parliament manages a 
budget of around £22 billion, which is spent among the devolved areas, listed 
above. Differently from the other devolved Assemblies, the Scottish Parlia-
ment is also given the power to vary income tax by up to three pence in a 
pound. However, the exercise of this power is subject to strong political 
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debate. Furthermore, the Parliament has control over local authority taxation 
in Scotland, and can raise revenue by charging fees for certain public services. 
Regarding the second innovative characteristic of the Scottish Parliament, 
the Convention aimed to model a parliament that was to be significantly 
different from the Westminster model (Mitchell, 2000: 606). The John Wheat-
ley Centre, the Scottish think tank later renamed as the Centre for Scottish 
Public Policy, commissioned a draft of standing orders to be submitted to the 
Constitutional Convention. The authors of the document, 'To Make the 
Parliament of Scotland a Model for Democracy', claimed the necessity to 
abandon the Westminster model and the importance of trying 'to invent and 
adapt procedures and working practices better suited to and arising from 
Scotland's more democratic civic tradition' (Brown, 2000: 545). The work 
done by the Convention was followed up by the Consultative Steering Group 
(CSG) appointed in 1997 by the Secretary for State for Scotland. The CSG 
was asked to develop proposals for the practical operation of the new parlia-
ment (Scottish Office). The Minister for Devolution chaired it, and 12 mem-
bers, who included representatives from the four major Scottish parties, local 
authorities, academic, business and civic groups and interests, formed it. In 
1999 the CSG published the report 'Shaping Scotland's Parliament', which 
included a comprehensive design for the working of the parliament. 7 Four 
main principles that had to inform the operations of the new parliament were 
identified (Scottish Office): 
• Power-sharing: the Scottish Parliament should embody and reflect the 
sharing of power between the people of Scotland, the legislators and 
the Scottish Executive. 
• Accountability: the Scottish Executive should be accountable to the 
Scottish Parliament and the Parliament and the Executive should be 
accountable to the people of Scotland. 
• Access and participation: the Scottish Parliament should be accessible, 
open, responsive and develop procedures that make possible a participa-
tive approach to the development, consideration and scrutiny of policy 
and legislation. 
• Equal opportunities: the Scottish Parliament in its operation and its 
appointments should recognise the need to promote equal opportunities 
for all. 
Following the application of these principles, a comprehensive committee 
system has been established. There are seventeen committees divided into 
eight mandatory committees (Europe, Equal Opportunities, Finance, Audit, 
Procedures, Standards, Public Petitions, and Subordinate Legislation) and 
nine subject committees that mirror the departments within the Executive. 
The membership of the committees reflects the political balance of parliament 
itself, thus avoiding the leadership of one single party, and the committees' 
conveners usually do not belong to the governing parties. This arrangement 
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was designed to guarantee a potential dynamic relationship between the 
executive and the parliamentary committees, even more so when the convener 
of a committee is from a non-executive party (Brown, 2000: 552). In order to 
apply the principle of power sharing, and to ensure greater accountability, 
committees have the power to initiate legislation, to scrutinise and monitor 
government legislation, and to conduct enquiries and take evidence from 
Ministers and civil servants (Brown, 2000; Mitchell, 2000). In order to com-
ply with the principle of openness and greater access and participation, 
committees have been recommended to exercise their power of consultation 
with members of the civic society and to meet outside Edinburgh. Thus, this 
novel role for committees, both as policy makers assisting the Executive and 
scrutinisers of the actions of the Executive, has been considered as a key 
distinctive feature (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001: 268). 
Before devolution, the UK Parliament usually considered only one or two 
Scottish Bills each session. In the first legislative period 22 Bills have become 
Acts (http://scottish.parliament.uk), dealing with important issues such as 
housing, the creation of national parks, regulating issues relating to adults 
with incapacity. The ability to legislate on specific Scottish issues has been 
considered an important achievement of the new institution, which would 
not have been achieved without devolution (Scotland Office). In addition, 
individual members can introduce bills, and backbench members have had a 
greater opportunity for success than in the Westminster Parliament, in fact in 
the first legislative period, a number of Member's Bills had been introduced, 
six of which have been passed. 
Devolution in Wales 
The pre-devolution arrangements 
Wales became part of the UK in the sixteenth century, and it was treated as if 
it were part of England, making it more difficult for the Welsh people to 
maintain their identity: 'For Wales, unlike Scotland, did not enjoy those 
independent institutions, which not only ensured separate treatment, but, 
more crucially, preserved the memory of independent statehood' (Bogdanor, 
2001: 144). 
Similarly to Northern Ireland and Scotland, nationalistic movements began 
towards the end of the nineteenth century. Their claims were principally con-
cerned with reaching equality with England more than obtaining separation 
from the UK. The ferment for Irish Home Rule did provide a stimulus to the 
development of Welsh nationalist movements, as it had in Scotland. However, 
home rule in Wales was not considered an issue to be pursued as there was 
no desire for separation from the UK (Bogdanor, 2001: 147). 
During the last twenty years of the nineteenth century, the Welsh liberals 
were trying to establish recognition of Welsh cultural aspirations and religious 
uniqueness, more than arguing for a Welsh Parliament. Indeed, unlike 
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Scotland, which had its own institutions in which the Scottish identity was 
formally recognised by the establishment of the Scottish Office, in Wales there 
were not specific political institutions. In the 1900s there had been a series of 
reforms, which aimed to decentralise administration. This process slowly 
created a Welsh distinctiveness, which therefore was not the result of strong 
nationalistic pressures, but it was a political decision taken at central level 
(in Whitehall and Westminster). The process of decentralisation concerned 
three areas: education, national insurance and agriculture. In 1907 a Welsh 
Department of the Board of Education was established. The creation of the 
Welsh Department was considered beneficial because it would have helped in 
providing 'a unified approach to the educational problems of each individual 
authority so that, at any one time, officials of the Welsh Department were 
able to see the whole range of educational services provided in a particular 
area' (Bogdanor, 2001: 157). 
The Department had the power to transfer funds between primary and 
secondary education, and also to promote education in the Welsh language. 
In 1911, following Lloyd George's National Insurance Act, separate 
national commissions were established in Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales. The creation of the commissions was a successful project of decentral-
isation. In 1912, following the establishment of the Scottish Board of Agri-
culture, the office of Agricultural Commissioner for Wales, and the Advisory 
Council for Wales were set up. It was felt that a department dealing with these 
issues in Whitehall would not have been able to understand and deal with 
specific Welsh matters. This process of administrative decentralisation con-
tinued steadily and by the second half of the 1900s seventeen departments 
had decentralised administrative units in Wales. This process of decentralisa-
tion was not considered a form of devolution, with the government in London 
initiating it only for pragmatic reasons. In 1951 the first Minister for Welsh 
Affairs was appointed. He had no executive powers, nor a departmental 
apparatus. His powers were restricted to being accountable to the House of 
Commons for the effects of government policy and action, established in the 
annual White Paper on Wales, and leading the debate on the Welsh Day. 
The first Secretary of State for Wales was established in 1964, following the 
Labour party's election victory. The powers held by the Secretary were fairly 
limited. He only had executive powers over the role of the Minister of Hous-
ing and Local Government and over roads. In addition, the Secretary was to 
take part in the policy-formulation process for the economic plans for Wales, 
and he was granted the powers of supervising the execution of the national 
policy within Wales by the other departments. The executive powers of the 
Secretary of State for Wales gradually expanded and by the 1970s its range of 
responsibilities became almost as broad as the ones held by the Scottish 
Office (Bogdanor, 2001: 160). 
Similar to the Scottish Office, the boundaries of responsibility and abilities 
to exercise executive powers by the Secretary of State for Wales were limited 
by the rules of Whitehall. Welsh needs could be met only as long as their 
30 Simona Scarparo 
claims were not to clash against policies set by the government in London. 
While the Scottish Secretary was able, to a certain extent, to contend for a 
separate and different Scottish legislation, the Welsh Office, due to the fact 
that Wales, unlike Scotland, did not have a separate legal system, exercised 
mostly a function of modifying the policy set by Whitehall in order to take 
into consideration Welsh needs and differences. 
The criticisms of the Welsh Office were similar to the ones already examined 
for the Scottish Office. Griffiths (1999: 794) argues that in Wales different 
policies, through public expenditure, were implemented, as the result of two 
factors. First, territorial ministers had the option, in terms of financial 
resources and autonomy, of undertaking their own policies. Second, they were 
operating in a political culture considered to be more consensual than the one 
in England. However, the same author concludes that 'the level of Welsh 
autonomy was not appreciably greater at the end of the twentieth century than 
it was at its beginning' (Griffiths, 1999: 805). Thus, whilst the Welsh Office was 
responsible for several areas, it was considered to operate as an 'outpost of the 
central administration' (McAllister, 1999: 635). McAllister also criticises the 
process of administrative devolution towards the Welsh Office practised by 
the British government 'The Welsh Office's incremental and disjoined accrual 
of powers and responsibilities over the past thirty-five years meant a lack of 
strategy for coherent national policy-making' (McAllister, 1999: 635). 
In addition, there was concern over the possibility that the more responsi-
bilities the Welsh Secretary was attributed, the more decisions would have 
been made by civil servants. This implies the lack of a popular mandate, a 
'democratic deficit' (McAllister, 1999: 635), which needed to be addressed. 
The problem of 'democratic deficit' was amplified by the fact that there was 
little time dedicated in the House of Commons to scrutinising the work of the 
Welsh Office. In fact, the Welsh question time usually lasted for an hour every 
month. Thus, the Welsh Office, as well as the Scottish Office, was regarded as 
unaccountable. This democratic deficit raised the issue of why Wales should 
be held accountable to Westminster when dealing with Welsh local issues. The 
creation of a directly elected assembly would allow developing and imple-
menting policy differentiation with a legislative body that could be held 
accountable for it (Griffiths, 1999: 805). In 1979 the Scotland and Wales Bill 
proposed to apply home rule in Wales as well as in Scotland, as already 
examined. However, the Bill proposed an asymmetric form of devolution for 
Wales. While in Scotland the devolved assembly was to be given some execu-
tive powers over devolved Scottish Office responsibilities, in Wales the Bill 
established only local-government style committees. However, there was little 
support for devolution with only one in four voting in favour in the refer-
endum (O'Neill, 2000: 73; McAllister, 1999: 636). 
During the 1980s the debate on home rule echoed that in Scotland, conces-
sions towards the recognition of a Welsh identity were made through the 
creation of the Welsh Language Board, and the Welsh Development Agency. 
However, there was still not very strong support for devolution. According to 
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O'Neill this was a reflection 'of deep ambivalence about political identity', 
and of the appreciation of a close integration of Wales with England (O'Neill, 
2000: 76). Laffin and Thomas (2000: 558) identify three key segments of 
Wales: a Welsh-speaking Wales, a 'Welsh' Wales, which is centred on the most 
important old industrial areas, and an English Wales. To the extent that these 
segments exist, then different identities have difficulties in coexisting and they 
impinge upon the life and debates of Welsh politics. 
The Wales A ct 1998 
The process of shaping the Welsh Assembly was characterised by the need to 
build a civic and political consciousness about its importance and about the 
Assembly's potential democratic benefits. Because of the lack of a strong 
support towards devolution, the idea of a Welsh Assembly was a fragile one, 
which needed to build up a 'sense of legitimacy' (Laffin and Thomas, 2000: 
573). The historical background of separateness and the geographical and 
economic entwinement with England restrained the development of a strong 
sense of Welsh identity. 
During the 1990s, an organised campaign for devolution emerged, but 
there was not official support from the political parties, and the campaigners 
did not have a strong public image or significant financial resources. The 
Campaign for a Welsh Assembly was established in 1987, advocating the 
economic benefits of a potential assembly. Its work continued in the 1990s. In 
1993 it changed its name to The Parliament for Wales Campaign, trying to 
establish a convention similar to the one established in Scotland at that time, 
bringing together members of the different political parties in favour of a 
directly elected assembly. In July 1997, the Government published a White 
Paper, A Voice for Wales, which outlined proposals for devolution in Wales. 
These proposals were endorsed in the referendum of 18 September 1997. 
Subsequently, Parliament passed the Government of Wales Act 1998, which 
enabled the transfer of the devolved powers and responsibilities from the 
Secretary of State for Wales to the Assembly to take place on 1 July 1999. 
After the 1997 Westminster elections, the Secretary of State for Wales set 
up the National Assembly Advisory Group, with the task of preparing guid-
ance for the Standing Orders of the Assembly. The establishment of the 
National Advisory Group had deeper meaning and role than just setting up 
a proposal-working group. It was meant to strengthen a pro-devolution con-
sensus among the political parties and the civil society (cultural and business 
groups) (Laffin and Thomas, 2000: 561). Fourteen members constituted the 
group. There were representatives of the four main political parties, of the 
groups campaigning for equal opportunities, local government, business, 
trade unions and a representative from the voluntary sector. This broad rep-
resentation was once more an attempt to provide the future Assembly with 
the necessary legitimacy and recognition and also a way of reinforcing the 
principle of 'inclusiveness', which is a hallmark of the new institution. The 
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way in which the group operated was based on the need to work towards 
shared objectives. Subgroups were established, which were working on sub-
jects such as legislative procedures, bilingualism, equal opportunity and 
issues related to open access (Laffin and Thomas, 2000: 562). The document 
that resulted from this cross-party group designed the operational practices 
of the new institution, and it was discussed with public meetings held across 
Wales in order to reach a wide consensus. 
In contrast from Scotland, in setting up the operational framework for the 
National Assembly, the group was concerned mostly with the creation of a 
framework that would allow the Assembly to be as flexible as possible in 
determining its methods of working (McAllister, 1999: 640), and it was less 
concerned about conceiving an Assembly as different as possible from the 
Westminster model. However, there was an aspiration to design a Welsh 
Assembly based on a different model from both Westminster and local 
government. Key members of the Welsh political elite and also senior Welsh 
civil servants aspired to a different model, 'a sharp break with the traditions 
of a hidebound, anachronistic Westminster Parliament' (Laffin and Thomas, 
2000: 559). The work of the group was then continued by the Standing 
Orders Commission, which presented a report where the procedures for the 
Assembly's operation were established. Similarly to the operation of the 
Scottish Parliament, the key elements of the new institutions were openness 
and accountability. 
The Government of Wales Act established a membership of sixty members, 
elected for four years. The elections for the first Assembly were held on 6 May 
1999 and each voter had two votes. The first vote is used to elect a local or 
constituency Member in the same way as MPs are elected to the House of 
Commons. Forty Assembly Members are elected on this 'first past the post' 
basis, one from each constituency in Wales. The second vote is used to elect 
twenty additional Members, on a regional basis, according to the Additional 
Member System. Thus, in Wales as well as in Scotland there was attention to 
guarantee proportional representation of political parties, reflecting to some 
extent the share of the vote political parties received. There are five electoral 
regions, based on the European Parliamentary Constituencies created in 
1994, and each region returns four Members to the Assembly. 
The National Assembly for Wales is considered to be a 'unique institution 
within the United Kingdom' (Laffin and Thomas, 2000: 557). The peculiarity 
of the Welsh institutions is to be found in the arrangements devised for the 
Assembly's political executive. As already pointed out earlier, the executive 
style proposed for Wales was to be based on the local government model 
of subject committees. This proposition had been modified, and a hybrid 
system, which combines the Westminster cabinet model with the committee 
structure, was agreed. Similar to Westminster there is a cabinet, but there is 
also a system of multi-functional committees, which does not resemble the 
Westminster model. This model came about after debate among the members 
of the National Advisory Group. They considered the committee model as 
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inconvenient and inefficient because it could hold back the decision-making 
processes. At the same time they expressed concern over the cabinet model, as 
a way of centralising too much power in the hands of the First Minister, 
therefore undermining the key principles of power-sharing and inclusiveness. 
On the other hand, the cabinet model was appreciated because of its potential 
for delivering a more rapid decision-making process and for guaranteeing 
focused responsibility among the members of the executive (Laffin and 
Thomas, 2000: 567). 
Unlike Scotland, each area of responsibility of the Assembly for policy-
making is defined in the Transfer Order. This arrangement has been considered 
a potential constraint of the powers of the Welsh Assembly (McAllister, 
1999: 643), compared to the Scottish model. It also raises concerns about the 
nature and the extent of the powers held by the Assembly, as the implication 
of this limitation of role and responsibilities might imply 'responsibility 
without power' (McAllister, 2000: 595). The Assembly does not have the 
power of issuing primary legislation, but it is able to modify legislation in 
order to adapt it to specific Welsh needs. It does not have tax-varying powers, 
again distinguishing it from Scotland. 
The Cabinet is the main decision-making body within the Assembly. Mem-
bers of the Cabinet carry out most of the Assembly's functions by authority 
of the Assembly as a whole. 
The Government of Wales Act requires the Assembly to elect a First 
Minister to serve as the leader of the Cabinet and the political leader of the 
Assembly. The First Minister in turn appoints eight Ministers (also called 
Secretaries), who make up the remainder of the Cabinet. Six Ministers are 
responsible for particular areas of policy decided by the First Minister, cover-
ing the following portfolios: 
• Economic Development 
• Agriculture and Rural Development 
• Local Government 
• Environment and Planning 
• Health and Social Services 
• Pre-16 and Post-16 Education. 
Additionally, two members of the Cabinet - the Business Minister and the 
Finance Minister are concerned with managing the Assembly's business and 
finances respectively. All Ministers, and the Cabinet as a whole, are account-
able to the Assembly. They have to answer oral and written questions from 
Assembly Members and (with the exception of the Business Minister and the 
Finance Minister) are also members of, and accountable to, the relevant 
subject committees. 
Assembly members from all parties are able to express their opinions as 
to how each subject area should be dealt with by the executive. They do this 
mostly through subject committees, which cover the following areas: 
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• Agriculture and Rural Development Committee 
• Culture Committee 
• Economic Development Committee 
• Education and Lifelong Learning Committee 
• Environment, Planning and Transport Committee 
• Health and Social Services Committee 
• Local Government and Housing Committee. 
The subject committees, which cover the ministers' portfolios, have the power 
to develop policies and to scrutinise what the Assembly does. Members are 
elected to work on the subject committees so that the balance of political 
groups in the Assembly is reflected, as far as possible, in the membership of 
each committee. The committees' membership varies from seven up to eleven 
members. The ministers are also members of these committees, but they do 
not chair them. Chairs of the subject committees are from the opposition 
party, sometime selected from minority parties, in order to guarantee the 
principle of inclusivity. This arrangement is considered to be an important 
novelty and a departure from the Westminster model (Laffin and Thomas, 
2000: 557). The establishment of the subject committees is intended to coun-
teract the power of the executive. They are not decision-making institutions, 
but they are able to scrutinise the executive's operations, calling civil servants 
to answer questions in open sessions. The subject committees would also have 
an important contributive role in dealing with significant secondary legisla-
tion, developing new policies, overseeing public appointments and also par-
ticipating in the discussion on setting the budgetary priorities. These roles 
of the subject committees, which differentiate them substantially from the 
Westminster subject committees, are considered crucial for the transparency 
of the executive work. In addition, they allow all members to actively partici-
pate in the activities of the Assembly. 
Other important committees, in addition to the subject committees, 
include for example: Audit Committee; Business Committee; Equality of 
Opportunity Committee; European Affairs Committee; Legislation Commit-
tee; Children's Commissioner Appointment Advisory Committee; Planning 
Decision Committee. Among these ones, the Business Committee, composed 
of the Presiding Officer and representatives of the Cabinet and of the minor-
ity parties, has the important function of organising the operations of the 
Assembly. The committees dealing with European issues and equal opportun-
ities were suggested by the National Advisory Group in order to guarantee 
that significant issues, which would affect several subject areas, are treated in 
a coherent way. 
In addition to the subject committees, and the other committees mentioned 
above, the Act established the creation of regional committees, which do not 
exist in the other devolved institutions. They are advisory bodies designed 
to enhance consultation and representation, which would establish closer 
links between historically different and geographically separated parts of the 
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country. The regional committees represent the needs and interests of their 
localities and they convey issues of local concern to the full Assembly and 
to the subject committees. There are four regional committees, which are 
made up of members from the relevant constituency and electoral region. 
According to Laffin and Thomas (2000: 571) they were established to dissi-
pate anxieties about strong domination from the political centre. 
The arrangements devised for the Welsh Assembly have raised the question 
of whether the subject committees can combine effectively the function of 
scrutinising the executive work while at the same time participating in policy 
development. Laffin and Thomas (2000: 575) observe that on the one hand 
the function of scrutiny is bound to create tensions between the Assembly 
and the executive, and therefore between committees and Assembly Secretar-
ies. On the other hand, the function of policy development needs the estab-
lishment of a co-operative environment in order to secure agreement between 
members. 
Conclusion 
The path leading to devolution cannot be considered a stable and homo-
geneous process across Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. As described 
in the previous sections, the instances that brought about devolution are 
different for each polity. These differences reflect past experiences, historical 
ambitions and political interplay (Meehan, 1999: 19). 
The different strengths and perceptions of national identity in Scotland 
and Wales is reflected in the process of designing devolution and the new 
institutions. According to Laffin and Thomas (2000: 574) an important dis-
tinction between the Welsh and the Scottish design process has to be attrib-
uted to the duration of the coalition-building procedure. In Scotland it 
developed over a longer time span than in Wales, since the devolution scheme 
started to be constructed by the Constitutional Convention. 
Devolution has been defined as an 'asymmetrical constitutional archi-
tecture' (O'Neill, 2000: 78), in which Scotland and Northern Ireland benefit 
from wider legislative powers than does Wales. In Wales, the limited legisla-
tive competencies are a direct consequence of these asymmetrical arrange-
ments, and make the Welsh arrangements the most fragile of the three 
devolved polities. This asymmetry could have a positive effect in trying to 
push the political entity that enjoys less independence to imitate the 'more 
devolved' institutions. However, these differences in legislative arrangements 
can prove to be difficult to manage (O'Neill, 2000: 78). 
The asymmetrical nature of devolution affects the financial arrangements 
as well as the boundaries of legislative competencies. Tax-raising powers are 
strictly regulated by the legislation that introduced devolution. Wales and 
Northern Ireland do not have any discretion on tax raising. Scotland has 
been granted tax-varying powers to top up the resources transferred from 
the Treasury. This arrangement has stirred debates on whether 'a parliament 
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without taxation' is somehow a reduced institution (Meehan, 1999: 26). In 
Wales the absence of tax-varying power is in accordance with the legislative 
arrangements by which primary legislation has not been transferred from 
Westminster. In Northern Ireland, despite the Assembly being granted the 
power of issuing primary legislation, tax-varying powers were somehow 
'regarded as unnecessary or, as a too radical departure from uniformity 
within the UK' (Meehan, 1999: 26). In this way the Secretaries of State retain 
an important power, as they are the 'principal paymasters to the devolved 
administrations': 'The perception of London holding the purse strings, 
thereby exerting an implicit, even an overt, veto over spending, could easily 
become another source of friction, since the fiscal arrangements of the union 
state remain largely intact' (O'Neill, 2000: 84). 
Despite these different frameworks and powers, there is no doubt that devol-
ution represents a 'large constitutional upheaval' (Bradbury and Mitchell, 
2001: 257), and also an important process that has brought into the British 
political system significant innovations. The most significant ones are related 
to the new values that the new institutions carry, and their potential con-
sequences. The introduction of power-sharing, inclusiveness, participation 
and accountability as fundamental principles, underlies the existence of 
the new parliament/assemblies. The principles of inclusiveness and power-
sharing had found a practical application even prior to the establishment of 
the new parliament/assemblies. They led to the modification of the electoral 
system, in Scotland and Wales, through the Additional Members System 
(AMS), which introduced an element of proportional representation. The 
introduction of a system of proportional representation has been an import-
ant 'historic departure' (McAllister, 1999: 642), pioneered in the first Welsh 
and Scottish elections (McAllister, 2000: 592). 
An important question resides in the way in which the principle of 
accountability is going to be applied. The different nature of the devolution 
process, and the diverse instances that brought about devolution in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales might influence the way in which accountability 
is achieved and pursued in each devolved institution. 
Notes 
1 The Secretaries of States for Scotland and for Wales were abolished in June 2003. 
These roles may have been considered superfluous as devolution bedded down from 
then until 2007. However, these Offices have not totally disappeared as they have 
become 'attached' to the Transport Secretary (for Scotland) and to the new Leader 
of Commons (for Wales). 
2 British governments made provision by law on devolution three times: in 1973, 1975 
and 1982, which failed as a government by agreement between the different parties 
involved was not achieved. 
3 According to Wilford (2000: 578) the Agreement is built according to the key fea-
ture of 'consociationalism', which consists of the following key characteristics: 
cross-community power-sharing; proportionality rule; segmental autonomy; and 
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mutual veto. These are designed to enable political governance in a divided society 
and where majority rule is not tenable. 
4 Or, alternatively, by a weighted majority of 60 per cent members present and voting, 
including at least 40 per cent of unionists present and voting, and 40 per cent of 
nationalists present and voting. 
5 The Barnett formula (Research Paper 01/108, 2001, http://www.parliament.uk) is a 
non-statutory mechanism used by the UK government for apportioning public 
expenditure based on population share and not need. It aims to ensure that changes 
to programmes in England are reflected in equivalent changes in the budgets of the 
devolved institutions. 
6 As Bogdanor recounts, between 1890 and 1914, propositions for Scottish Home 
Rule appeared thirteen times in front of the House of Commons. 
7 The CGS was not the only group working on the development of the new parlia-
ment. In 1998 the Financial Issues Advisory Group (FIAG) set the Secretary of 
State for Scotland the task of proposing rules, procedures, standing orders and 
legislation for the handling of financial issues by the Scottish Parliament. 
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